Resilience of Backbone Provider Networks by Çetinkaya, Egemen K. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications Collection
Resilience of Backbone Provider Networks
Çetinkaya, Egemen K.
Resilience of Backbone Provider Networks. Egemen K. Çetinkaya, Justin P. Rohrer,
James P.G. Sterbenz, IEEE INFOCOM Student Workshop, March, 2012.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/37225
Resilience of Backbone Provider Networks
Egemen K. C¸etinkaya, Justin P. Rohrer, and James P.G. Sterbenz
Information and Telecommunication Technology Center
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
The University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA
{ekc, rohrej, jpgs}@ittc.ku.edu
http://www.ittc.ku.edu/resilinets/maps/
Abstract—Network topology models have drawn tremendous
interest from the research community. Traditionally, Internet
modelling has been done at the AS or router level, in part
because this information is most available from tomography and
public databases such as Rocketfuel. We argue that physical
topology analysis is important for a more complete understanding
of Internet structure, particularly for insight into the resilience
and survivability of infrastructure against attacks and natural
disasters. However, complexity and lack of complete data sets
has hindered accurate topology modelling. In this short paper,
we show through a sample case that physical topologies have
significantly different characteristics from traffic engineering
and router-level overlays, and are important for analysis of
geographically-correlated failures.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The Global Internet is a complex, critical infrastructure
and the research community has been analysing the topology
of the Internet for over a decade. The primary focus has
been on the logical aspects of the topology, since tools were
developed to collect, measure, and analyse IP-layer properties
of the Internet. Physical topologies provide services for logical
layers, and defining physical connectivity is a major research
challenge [1], [2]. Moreover, to study behaviour of the In-
ternet under correlated geographic failure scenarios, physical
topologies are necessary [3], [4].
Physical topologies provide the necessary connectivity,
while logical topologies enable data communication between
end systems. Resilience characteristics of the two topologies
differ in part due to differences in the topological properties
and in part due to different challenges networks face. For
example, while a DDoS attack aims to consume network
resources on an end host, the underlying physical infrastructure
can be intact. Likewise, an earthquake might damage the
physical infrastructure and if there is no geographical diversity
built in the system this might cause the overlaid logical
topology to become dysfunctional. We argue that resilience
analysis of individual topologies (e.g. AS-level, IP-layer) alone
is not enough and a collective analysis of networks is required
to design resilient networks. Therefore, understanding the
resilience characteristics of networks and further developing
cost-efficient mechanisms to cope with network challenges of
such complex systems is crucial.
While the physical topologies are crucial in understanding
and modelling Internet, public data about physical topologies
are limited. Two primary reasons that the service providers un-
willingness to share the data are business competitiveness and
security concerns. In this extended abstract, first we present
our ongoing efforts towards making the physical topologies
available. Next, we analyse network performance of a physical
and logical topology against a correlated failure scenario using
the ns-3 network simulator. Finally, we discuss our next steps
towards developing resilient topologies.
II. PHYSICAL TOPOLOGIES
Physical topologies are necessary to study the network
resilience for geographically correlated failures [3], [4]. How-
ever, a lack of physical topology data hinders the study of
resilience properties. We use the US long-haul fiber-optic
routes map data to generate physical topologies [5]. In this
map US fiber-optic routes cross cities throughout US and each
ISP has a different colored link to differentiate between them.
We project the cities to be physical node locations and connect
them based on the map, which is sufficiently accurate for a
national-scale map. We convert this visual data into machine
understandable format by generating adjacency matrices for
each individual ISP provider. We developed the KU-TopView
(The University of Kansas Topology Viewer) visualiser, using
the Google Map API and JavaScript to visually present these
maps [6]. Unlike other visualisation tools, KU-TopView makes
raw data available in the universal form of an adjacency matrix
along with the node coordinates. The physical topology of a
tier-1 ISP is shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Sprint physical topology
2III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Given the size of the network and interactions among
protocols, analysing complex topologies such as the Internet
is non-trivial. On the other hand, simulations are powerful
tools to analyse such complex interactions and we use the
ns-3 [7] network simulator to study the performance of
physical and logical topologies against correlated failures. We
investigated performance of logical topologies under network
challenges previously [3], [8]. To illustrate the importance of
physical topologies, we demonstrate an area-based challenge
scenario representative of a hurricane hitting south central
US as shown in Figure 2. In this figure, we overlay the
Rocketfuel-inferred [9], [10] Sprint logical topology on top
of the Sprint physical topology using KU-TopView. In this
illustrative challenge scenario a large-scale disaster with an
increasing diameter impacts the south central US.
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Fig. 3. South central US challenge PDR [3]
Network performance of physical and logical topologies
when the south central US region is challenged is shown in
Figure 3. The application traffic model in logical topology
for our simulations is set to be CBR (constant bit rate)
traffic between each pair of node. Since the physical topology
consists of physical devices such as repeaters and ADMs
(add-drop multiplexers) not all the nodes in a given physical
topology will be a traffic generation source. To realistically
match to a traffic-matrix, we use the Sprint MPLS PoP [11]
nodes as traffic sources. Only one link in the logical topology
is impacted throughout this challenge and due to geographic
diversity built in this network, the PDR (packet delivery ratio)
is 100%. On the other hand, the PDR of the physical topology
drops to 98%, 91%, and 86%, respectively, as the challenge
area covers more nodes and links. This demonstrates that it
is imperative to study the impact of area-based challenges on
the physical topologies [3], [4].
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this extended abstract, we discussed the necessity of
physical topologies to realistically evaluate network resiliency.
We argued that a collective topology information is needed to
realistically evaluate resilience properties of networks. Further-
more, while geographic diversity is an essential mechanism to
increase the resiliency of network, there is a trade-off between
the increased level of resiliency and the cost of building such
resilient systems. To design cost-efficient resilient topologies
we plan to use KU-LocGen (Location and Cost-Constrained
Network Topology Generator) [12], a synthetic topology gen-
erator, to investigate trade-offs between resiliency properties
and cost of building such topologies.
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